Abstract: We investigate the relationship between the cost of debt issued by bank and thrift holding companies (BHCs, THCs) and their use of Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances. Cost of debt is used as a measure of bank riskiness for the first time in a FHLB study. A twoequation model of FHLB advances and cost of debt is estimated. Three main results are obtained. First, greater reliance on advances by BHCs and THCs is associated with lower cost of debt in the pre-crisis period, and more strongly so during the crisis, because granting of advances sends a positive signal to the market about FHLB's support. Second, greater HC cost of debt, as an explanatory variable, is associated with smaller advances as FHLBs restrict advances to riskier HCs. Third, we find no separate effect on the cost of debt from FHLB membership. Our results are robust to 3SLS estimation, used to address endogeneity, and to alternative model specifications. The negative association between cost of debt and advances suggests that BHCs and THCs do not use advances to make riskier loans and that FHLB policies and services have some risk-reducing effects which more than offset the effect of potential moral hazards.
and world financial markets. It follows that the behaviour of the FHLBs, as major players in this market, can significantly influence the largest world economies.
Researchers differ on whether the FHLBs increase or decrease the financial system's risk. Nickerson and Phillips (2004) and Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008) argue that FHLBs allow their members to increase their risk by providing them with additional funds to make risky loans that they otherwise would not have been able to make (moral hazard). According to these authors, by taking advances, FHLB members can make risky loans while avoiding market discipline through higher-cost debt because interest rates on advances are the same, regardless of member riskiness.
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In contrast, Hein (2011, 2009) propose that FHLBs reduce bank risk through advances-based collateral requirements and required purchase of FHLB stock, rationing of advances to riskier members, FHLB-provided risk management services, and the use confidential regulatory information to make decisions about advances. Moreover, regulators can take F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 supervisory actions to deter FHLBs from lending to risky members. Advances may also reduce risk during credit crunches when they are made available to healthy banks. These forces tend to counterbalance the forces that could lead to a positive relationship between advances and risk.
The net effect of the above countervailing powers is an empirical question that we seek to investigate in this paper. Our approach is to use yield spreads on bank holding company (BHC) and thrift holding company (THC) bonds as a market-based measure of their risk and to examine whether, controlling for other factors, FHLB membership and advances are associated with higher or lower yield spreads.
This study has four objectives. First, we investigate the relationship between BHCs' and THCs' dependence on FHLB advances and their cost of uninsured debt, a measure of risk. This provides evidence regarding competing theories of the association between FHLB advances and member HCs' risk. Second, we examine the relationship between FHLB membership, independent of advance-taking, and FHLB members' cost of debt. Markets may price different risk premia on debts issued by HCs that have an FHLB-member subsidiary, regardless of the size of the advances taken by the subsidiary. Third, we investigate the association between the level of advances utilized as the explained variable and HC riskiness to determine whether FHLBs curtail advances to riskier members (risk-based rationing). Fourth, we investigate whether the aforesaid relationships intensified during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Our contributions include the following. First, we use market data to develop a measure of HC risk, the yield spread on HC bonds. Previous research has relied on accounting-based risk measures which are backwards looking, lack information about systemic or macroeconomic risk, and are influenced by 'window dressing'. Market-based risk measures reflect investors'
knowledge of economy-wide conditions, expectations of future HC performance, and other F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 information that HC managers do not release in financial statements. Second, using bond market data, rather than stock market data, has advantages that bonds have well-defined future payoffs and empirical results based on bond pricing models are less likely to be driven by model misspecification, than stock valuation models (Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005; Deng Elyasiani, and Mao 2007; Kim, Li, and Li 2012) . 3 The bond market also merits attention because of its growing size. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA, 2012) , between 1990 and 2011, new debt issuance in the U.S. increased from $169 billion to $1.178 trillion while new equity issuance increased from $24 billion to $198 billion.
Third, we complement bank data with thrift data. Most studies on the relationship between FHLBs and their members have focused on commercial banks alone. Inclusion of thrifts widens the sample and allows us to test for differential behavioural patterns of the two groups, which until recently were overseen by separate regulatory authorities. Fourth, we measure variables at the HC level, while previous research has employed subsidiary-level data. The latter studies may under-or overestimate the risk of individual banks and thrifts because parent HCs may shift risk among their subsidiaries. Finally, we allow for the possibility of a simultaneous relationship between risk and reliance on FHLB advances by using a system model and estimating it using simultaneous-equation methods.
We obtain several interesting results. First, reliance on advances is associated with a lower cost of debt in the pre-crisis period and the association strengthens during the crisis (Q3-2007 to Q1-2009) . The former result is consistent with a special case of Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager's (2008) theoretical model and with the findings of Hein (2011, 2009 ). In economic terms, the magnitude of the effect is equivalent to an $896,000 reduction of the annual interest payment on the mean bond issue-size in the sample ($320 million) in the pre-crisis 3 Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) have found that BHC bond spreads rise as early as six quarters prior to their failure. period, and a reduction of $1,325,120 in the crisis period. As expected, the market places greater value on FHLB funds during the crisis because it signals FHLB's willingness to support the borrowing bank and reduces the bank's probability of bankruptcy.
Second, increased cost of debt is associated with a decline in the reliance on advances, as the explained variable, both before and during the crisis. This might reflect rationing by the FHLBs when FHLB member riskiness rises. It may also reflect members' avoidance of FHLB advances when they feel tightness in the market, in anticipation of stricter terms from FHLBs.
Third, as proposed by Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager's (2008) model, the cost of debt and reliance on advances demonstrate bidirectional interdependence. Fourth, FHLB membership, independent of advances, does not significantly influence the cost of debt throughout the sample.
Fifth, THCs' cost of debt is significantly higher than that of BHCs, and more so during the crisis.
In what follows, Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and presents the hypotheses, Section 3 describes the model and the estimation techniques, Section 4 discusses the data and sample selection, Section 5 reports the results, and Section 6 concludes. advances as a percentage of total assets, were, ceteris paribus, higher at the former group of thrifts. Nickerson and Phillips (2004) find similarities between the FHLB system and the U.S.
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farm credit system, which the federal government bailed out in the 1980s; the institutions comprising the two systems bear joint and several liability for their system's debt, and the two systems share similar rules on member stock ownership.
On the other hand, some researchers argue that a cooperative structure like the one used by the FHLBs can mitigate risk. For example, Stiglitz (1990) and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008) propose a model of FHLB funding in which FHLB members' reliance on advances and risk are jointly determined and have a bidirectional relationship. However, using bank-level accounting data, they find that increased reliance on advances is not associated with economically significant increases in most of the risk measures they consider. In some cases, it is associated with lower risk. For example, they find no economically significant relationship between borrowing banks' credit risk and advances to total assets ratios. They find a negative relationship between reliance on advances and interest rate The theoretical model and the empirical findings of Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager (2008) and the arguments put forward by Hein (2011, 2009 ) suggest that FHLB member banks' risk may be negatively associated with advance-taking and FHLB membership.
FHLBs are required to satisfy the relevant federal regulations such as a mandate to submit capital plans to their regulator. These plans generally require FHLB members to purchase more stock as they use more advances. Scott and Hein (2011) argue that because of these activity-based stock purchases, changes in the size of the FHLB balance sheets are self-capitalizing as they leave leverage unchanged for this line of business. Activity-based capital requirements also raises the opportunity cost of advances, aligns the interests of borrowing banks and FHLBs, and motivates banks to protect their own safety in order to protect the FHLBs' safety. Both forces curtail the growth in bank risk engendered by the low cost of advances (moral hazard).
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Second, Hein (2011, 2009) FHLB membership, independent of advance-taking, may also be associated with lower cost of debt because of the risk-mitigation resources, such as interest rate swaps, provided to FHLB members, that they could not otherwise obtain, access of FHLB members to emergency funding in credit crunches, and access to advances with maturities of up to 30 years that may make FHLB membership valuable to debt holders. We use a data set containing HCs that control FHLBmember subsidiaries and HCs that do not, to test hypothesis H 3 below within a multiple regression framework. Moreover, we investigate whether the relationship between cost of debt and FHLB membership strengthened during the crisis, hypothesis H 4 : H 3 : FHLB membership is associated with a lower cost of debt. The relationship between advances and cost of debt may be bidirectional in the sense that increased cost of debt (risk) may also impact the level of advances available to the FHLB member. In particular, when a FHLB member becomes riskier, the FHLB may curtail advances, creating an inverse relationship between the two variables. This relationship may strengthen during the financial crisis, if the FHLB becomes more sensitive to the risk behaviour of its members. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:
H 5 : Increased riskiness of a FHLB member is associated with a lower level of advances. 
Econometric Models
We specify a two-equation system model that allows the HC cost of debt and reliance on advances by the bank/thrift subsidiary to be jointly determined. The model is described by equations (1) - (2), the components of which will be defined below:
(1)
In this model, cost of debt and reliance on advances are proxied by the bond yield spread of the parent HC (SPREAD) and advances to total liabilities ratio (ADVANCES), respectively. Following the literature, the SPREAD equation controls for the bond-issuing HC's features, bond features, and time effects. HC features include its market-value volatility (VOL), size (the logarithm of the HCs' total assets, SIZE), return on assets (ROA), and a binary indicator of the extent of its involvement in deposit-taking (DI_FOCUS, equals one for HCs with subsidiary total deposits greater than or equal to 25 percent of the HC's total assets, zero otherwise). We also control for factors such as bond liquidity, measured by the time since the bond was issued (AGE), and the dollar amount of the bond issue at offering (ISSUE_SIZE), callability, putability, and junior status using binary variables CALL, PUT, and SENIOR. The CRISIS binary equals one from Q3-2007 through Q1-2009 and zero otherwise. We include a number of other control variables following Merton (1974) , Deng, Elyasiani, and Mao (2007) , Elyasiani, Jia, and Mao (Merton, 1974 
Data Sources and Sample Selection

Variable Construction
The methods used to calculate the model variables are summarized here and in Table 1 .
All data are quarterly. SPREAD is the median of the average daily yield spread, defined as the difference between yields on HC bonds and Treasury bonds with comparable maturities. The AGE is calculated by adding one to each bond's age (in years), then taking the logarithm to account for convexity in its relationship with SPREAD. ISSUE_SIZE is the logarithm of the dollar amount of the bonds' issue-size at offering. CALL, PUT, and SENIOR are set to one if the bond is callable, putable, or senior debt, respectively. CORE is the HCs' subsidiaries' total deposits minus brokered deposits divided by the HCs' total liabilities. The loan-deposit ratio 
Bond selection
The FISD is the source for bond data. Bonds' characteristics were matched to financial statement data using the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) numbers. Bonds are excluded if they are convertible to stocks, denominated in foreign currency, carry variable rate coupons or coupons that are not semi-annual. Bonds issued by HCs that control FHLB member insurance companies are excluded because data are not available on the advances taken by insurance companies. HCs that are acquisition targets are excluded beginning with the quarter of the acquisition announcement. Finally, bonds traded fewer than five times in a quarter were removed to reduce the influence of outliers.
Empirical Results
This section contains descriptive statistics and estimation results on the relationship between cost of debt and FHLB advances as well as cost of debt and FHLB membership. 
Descriptive Statistics
Multiple Regression Analysis: The OLS Results
The model described by equations (1)- (2) is estimated using the ordinary least We describe the changes in a typical HC's cost of debt attributable to a one unit change in each factor using both the basis-point (bp) change in the yield spread and the change in the dollar value of the annual interest payment on the sample mean bond offering of $320 million. We also measure the economic significance of ADVANCES by using our model estimate to predict the effect on SPREAD of a relatively large increase in the HC's reliance on FHLB advances -an increase equivalent to one standard deviation in the ADVANCES sample, or 4.141%. The effect of ADVANCES on SPREAD is defined as economically significant if such a change results in a long-term change in the annual interest payment of at least 1% of the mean bond issue-size ($3,200,000). Similarly, if a large, say 100 bps, change in SPREAD is associated with a long-term change in advances of at least 100 bps, we consider the effect to be economically significant.
The SPREAD Equation (Equation (1))
In the SPREAD equation, the coefficient of ADVANCES is negative and significant at Our finding is consistent with the empirical findings of Scott and Hein (2011) but stands in contrast to the argument that FHLB advances lead to greater member risk (Nickerson and Phillips, 2004; Stojanovic, Vaughan, and Yeager 2008) . Although banks can make risky loans using funds obtained through advances, risky loans are not the only way to profitably invest of these funds. Borrowing banks may choose to expand their loans in a responsible and profitable manner, especially when they know the FHLBs can take physical possession of their collateral and restrict their advances in future periods. If advances are conducive to greater bank risk, it seems that this effect is more than counterbalanced by the risk-reducing influences of FHLB policies and procedures.
In this model, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between crisis and advances (CRISIS *ADVANCES) is statistically insignificant indicating lack of support for hypotheses H 2 . Reliance on advances appears not to exert additional downward pressure on the cost of debt during the crisis. This result may, however, be partially due to To investigate the collinearity issue, we take two steps. First, we orthogonalize the membership binary variable (NO_FHLB) against ADVANCES by regressing the former on the latter and a constant term, and using the residuals as an alternative regressor. The results based on this measure, reported in Table 4 , Column 2, confirm the signs and significance of the corresponding coefficients reported in column 1. This indicates that the effect of collinearity is not strong. Second, as an alternative way to avoid collinearity, we also re-estimate Equation (1), removing the membership binary variable (NO_FHLB) and the associated interaction term CRISIS*NO_FHLB. Results are reported in Table 4 , Column 3. In this specification, the signs, significance and magnitudes of the coefficient of ADVANCES remain unchanged, confirming our earlier result in support of hypothesis H 1 . However, the coefficient of the interaction term between crisis and advances does become significant at the 10% level, indicating that the effect of advances on the cost of debt did deepen during the crisis and that hypothesis H 2 cannot be rejected. This is a reasonable finding because market participants value the FHLB support to its members to a greater extent when markets are in turmoil and liquidity is tight. This finding also provides some support for the argument that the correlation between advances and membership may have rendered the coefficient of the interaction term insignificant in the results reported in columns 1-2 of Table 4 . In section 6.3, we employ the Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) technique to address the possible endogeneity problem.
Hypotheses H 3 and H 4 suggest, respectively, that FHLB membership is associated with a lower cost of debt, beyond the effect exerted through advances, and that this effect strengthened In terms of magnitude, the coefficient estimate for the variable ADVANCES is -.022 (-2.2 bps) before the crisis and .031 during the crisis. The short-term effect of a one percentage point increase in the advances to liabilities ratio is a reduction of 2.2 bps in the cost of debt prior to the crisis and 3.1 bps during the crisis. These coefficient estimates imply a long-term effect on the yield spread of 6.8 bps and 10 bps, respectively, for a one percentage point increase in the advances to liabilities ratio. Accordingly, the long-term economic impact, measured by the effect of a one standard deviation (4.141%) change in ADVANCES on the cost of debt is 28 bps in the pre-crisis period and 40 bps during the crisis period, resulting in an interest saving of roughly $896,000 and $1,325,120, respectively, on the mean bond issue of $320 million.
The coefficient estimate for the crisis dummy (CRISIS) is positive and significant in all three models and stands at 0.305. This indicates that the risk premia on HC bonds increased by 30.5 bps during the crisis, in response to increased market volatility, tighter liquidity conditions, and bond buyers' elevated risk aversion. Risk premia show an autoregressive pattern as they are partially determined by their past values (SPREAD t-1 ). issue of $320 million, the pre-crisis effects translate to an increase in the annual cost of debt of $1.5 million over the short-run and $4.6 million over the long-run, while the in-crisis effects add an additional cost of $266,000 in the short-run and $816,000 in the long-run to the figures for the pre-crisis period. The in-crisis figures are economically significant and greater than the magnitudes of the corresponding figures for a one standard deviation change in reliance on advances. This suggests that markets paid even more attention to HCs' regulators than HC's reliance on advances. One interpretation is that markets considered the THC regulator (the OTS) to be less effective in disciplining its subjects than the BHC regulator (the Fed).
[ Table 4 goes about here]
The ADVANCES Equation (Equation 2)
Results for the ADVANCES equation are reported in Table 5 . In this model the coefficient estimate for the cost of debt (SPREAD) is negative (-0.126 ) and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that greater cost of debt is associated with reduced levels of advances.
This indicates that when a risky HC is disciplined by market participants, FHLBs also take complementary disciplinary action by restricting advances to it. This curtails the member's chances of making additional risky loans. Each FHLB charges the same interest rates on [ Table 5 
goes about here]
Advances' sensitivity to cost of debt is found to increase during the crisis as the coefficient of the interaction term CRISIS* SPREAD is negative (-0.240 ) and significant at the 1% level. In other words, as HCs become riskier during the crisis, the level of advances they can utilize will be, on average, subject to greater restrictions than under ordinary economic conditions. This result supports hypothesis H 6 and is consistent with Hein's (2011, 2009 ) argument that as riskiness of FHLB members rises, FHLBs require them to purchase additional FHLB capital, take possession of their collateral, or both.
In economic terms, a 100 bp increase in cost of debt (risk) is associated with a shortterm 12.6 bp reduction in ADVANCES before the crisis and an additional 24 bp reduction during the crisis, demonstrating a near-tripling of the effect (36.7 bp) in the latter period. Considering that the sample mean of ADVANCES is 2.72% of liabilities, a 100 bps increase in yield spread on HCs' unsecured debt translates into a reduction of the mean to 2.59% during the pre-crisis period and to 2.35% during the crisis period. The long-term effects of a 100 bps increase in yield spread on advances are much higher; 4.15 % before the crisis and an additional 7.87 % during the crisis. With these sharp effects, FHLBs are likely to cease to provide advances to 8 If a member FI is perceived to be beyond redemption, the FHLB may deny advances. Unfortunately, no data on cases of denial of advances are publicly available. These cases are kept strictly confidential. that the coefficients on cost of debt may encompass some reverse causality effects, reflecting the effect of advances on the cost of debt. If so, the cost of debt's effect on advances may be overestimated. This possibility will be accounted for in the next section with 3SLS estimation of a system model.
Among the control variables, the CRISIS dummy produces a shift upward in the level of advances, as it has a positive coefficient. This is to be expected as demand for advances grows during the times of crises, and one purpose of the FHLBs is to satisfy heightened demand during liquidity shortages. However, the negative coefficient of the interaction of CRISIS and SPREAD indicates that for riskier FHLB members, advances increased more slowly during the crisis than for safer members. 2SLSThe coefficients for CORE and LD_RATIO are both positive, suggesting that FHLB members with greater shares of core deposit in their liabilities, and greater loan to deposit ratios, take greater amounts of advances from the FHLBs. These findings are reasonable because deposits are highly volatile and higher loan to deposit ratios correspond to tighter liquidity conditions. Advances are also found to be highly autoregressive, suggesting that FHLB members taking advances continue to do so over time. The lagged ADVANCES coefficient is 0.97 meaning that as much as 97% of advances in each period were determined by their previous-period values.
Model Extensions and Robustness Checks
In this section, we report the results of an alternative estimation technique and several new model specifications. The OLS estimation results show that higher values of ADVANCES are associated with lower costs of debt (SPREAD), and, conversely, higher values of SPREAD are associated with lower ADVANCES. In other words, the two variables are jointly determined. The coefficient on ADVANCES in equation (1) and the coefficient on SPREAD in equation (2) may, therefore, suffer from endogeneity bias. To address this concern, we estimate our twoequation system using the 3SLS technique. This technique allows for contemporaneous correlations between the disturbances in the two equations and generates simultaneous twostage least squares estimates for each equation in the system. Given the simultaneity in the relationship between SPREAD and ADVANCES, the 3SLS results, displayed in Table 6 are deemed more reliable than the OLS results.
The 3SLS coefficient estimates for the variables of interest have the same signs as OLS estimates, and their statistical significance is also sustained at conventional levels. The coefficients for ADVANCES and the interaction term CRISIS*ADVANCES in equation (1) remain negative, providing support for hypotheses H 1 and H 2 , which purport a negative relationship between advances and cost of debt before the crisis that strengthens during the crisis. The latter result is an improvement over our OLS-based finding that suggested no effect from the crisis and supported rejection of H 2 . The SPREAD and the interaction term (SPREAD*CRISIS) coefficients in equation (2) remain negative, indicating that FHLBs restrict advances to riskier members, more so during the crisis. This estimated effect under 3SLS is stronger than under OLS. These results establish the robustness of our finding regarding H 1 to the 3SLS procedure, with the additional finding that H 2 is supported with the more reliable 3SLS procedure.
Several alternative model specifications are also used to check the robustness of our findings. If the supply-curve for bonds slopes upward, HCs that fund their operations with bonds to a larger extent would pay greater yields on their bonds and incur a higher average cost of debt. A counterbalancing effect, however, is that greater reliance on bonds may send a positive signal to independence from advances and willingness to subject itself to market discipline. To account for these countervailing effects, we extend our model to include BONDS, defined as bonds to liabilities ratio, as a regressor in the SPREAD equation. We estimate the augmented model using the 3SLS procedure.
[ Table 6 goes about here]
The signs and significance of the coefficients of the variables of interest (Table 6 ) remain the same while the coefficient of BONDS is statistically insignificant. To ensure that the leverage effect does not play a role, we also estimate the model, adding leverage (LEVERAGE), as an additional regressor. Results based on this extended model also show the coefficient of BONDS to be statistically insignificant, confirming our earlier result. As a further check, we also estimate the model with the logarithm of each HC's total bonds outstanding (LOG_TBO), instead of BONDS as well as LOG_TBO and LEVERAGE. The coefficient on LOG_TBO is insignificant in both models. We find that HCs' reliance on bonds impacts neither the results nor our conclusions in regards to reliance on advances.
Conclusion
Previous research has produced conflicting conclusions regarding the relationship between FI cost of debt and reliance on FHLB advances. Theoretically, some argue that a positive relationship can be expected because FHLB managers lack sufficient incentives to monitor their members' risk and because interest rates on advances are not risk-based. Others argue the opposite on the grounds that FHLBs curtail advances to risky members, raise their collateral and capital purchase requirements to increase their cost of advances, and offer risk management resources to members, some of which might not have access to such resources. We examine the issue using yield spreads on HC bonds to measure HC risk and advances to Our results indicate that higher reliance on advances is associated with lower, rather than higher, cost of debt, prior to the financial crisis, with the association strengthening during the crisis. On the other hand, changes in cost of debt are found to have a statistically and economically significant negative effect on advances to liability ratio before and during the crisis. This finding indicates FHLBs curtail advances to riskier members by rationing, raising collateral requirements, or both. This effect strengthens during the crisis. It is notable that this effect may not operate in each HC's case, as FHLBs may choose to help some risky banks in distress, but it does hold true on average. Furthermore, we find that FHLB membership, independent of advance taking, has an insignificant effect on cost of debt throughout the period studied, even though it entitles members to benefits other than advance taking such as risk management resources and emergency funding during credit crunches. Relative to BHCs, the cost of debt for THCs is greater by a significant margin and this gap widens during the crisis as the risk premia on riskier loans increase with market turbulence and increased uncertainty.
Our findings imply that FHLB policies toward advances do more to discourage risky lending than to encourage it. For policy makers, these results suggest that FHLB advances support homeownership without adding to the FHLB members' risk or to the financial system risk. They also provide evidence that FHLB advances are a back-up funding source for relatively low-risk banks and thrifts in both ordinary times and credit crunches, though the process limits availability to riskier borrowers, further stiffening the rate they have to pay in the market for funds. The overall effect on systemic risk is unclear. Note: This table reports the estimation results for the regression model describing the advances to liabilities ratio (ADVANCES). Columns 1-2 contain the coefficient estimates for the baseline model (Eq. 2) using the OLS and the 3SLS, respectively (see Section 3). White's (1980) standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficient estimates are the short-run effects. Columns 3-4 contain the long-run effects (the short-run effects divided by the adjustment term; 1-the coefficient of SPREAD t-1 ). Variable definitions are as in Table 1 , except for SIZE, which is the logarithm of total assets in thousands of dollars. *,**, and *** indicate statistical significances at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
